St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 4

Number 3

Article 16

12-1-1972

Psychiatrist's Testimony That State's Principal Witness's
Psychological Condition Might Prompt Him to Distort Facts Was
Not Admissible for Purposes of Impeachment of the Witness.
Joseph H. Vives

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph H. Vives, Psychiatrist's Testimony That State's Principal Witness's Psychological Condition Might
Prompt Him to Distort Facts Was Not Admissible for Purposes of Impeachment of the Witness., 4 ST.
MARY'S L.J. (1972).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol4/iss3/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Vives: Psychiatrist's Testimony That State's Principal Witness's Psychol

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

not on trial. We must look to the harm inflicted on Hoover. It is identical to the injury suffered by Bruton." 5
The instant case exemplifies the long standing problem of interpreting the confrontation clause. As the Solicitor General stated: "Our
experience with the Sixth Amendment has taught us that it does not
mean what it says ....Like all good constitutional provisions, the crisp

language of the confrontation clause turns out to be somewhat cryptic.''55 It is apparent that the importance of cross-examination or adequate safeguards loom larger as hearsay's damaging quality increases,
but at the same time the state should not as a matter of course be
deprived of apparently reliable hearsay when the declarant is legitimately unavailable. Perhaps the best means for the Supreme Court to
relieve lower courts of the burden of testing certain hearsay would be
to develop a standard that could serve as a solution to the lower courts
that is much more workable than the tests in Dutton, Green, and
Bruton. Such present tests are confusing and subject to radically different interpretations, as exemplified by the instant case.
Michael L. Vaughn

EVIDENCE-IMPEACHMENT
OF WITNESSES-PSYCHIATRIST's TESTIMONY THAT STATE'S PRINCIPAL WITNESS'S PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION
MIGHT PROMPT HIM To DISTORT FACTS WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE FOR
PURPOSES OF IMPEACHMENT OF THE WITNESS. Hopkins v. State,

480 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
The defendant, Gregory K. Hopkins, was convicted of unlawful
possession of heroin and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary
for five years. The defendant was convicted largely on the testimony
of Frank Marquez, a former heroin addict turned informer and undercover "buyer" for the Police Department of Austin, Texas. At trial,
Marquez gave the incriminating testimony of his narcotics transaction
with the defendant. The trial court refused to allow psychiatric testimony by a defense witness challenging the competence and credibility of
Frank Marquez. On appeal, the appellant alleged that the trial court
erred in not allowing testimony by the psychiatrist challenging the
credibility of Frank Marquez. Held-Affirmed. Expert testimony is
allowed for the purpose of impeachment of witnesses, but in the case
of psychiatric opinion, it is inadmissible due to its divergence of opinion
and frequent inexactness. It is more an art than a science. In view of
54 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 559 (5th Cir. 1972).
55 Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L.J. 711, 728
(1971).
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the nature of psychiatry, the jury would be often subjected to conflicting
witnesses and inexact opinions, the value of which would be minimal
in enabling the jury to decide the issue of credibility.
The problem presented in Hopkins is an issue of first impression
for the court. Other jurisdictions, both federal and state, however, have
been confronted with the concept of psychiatric testimony for impeachment of witnesses. Acceptance of such an investigative tool has
been mixed, with some jurisdictions making psychiatric testimony
inadmissible,' and others adopting it as proper court procedure.2 A
large segment of authority allowing psychiatric opinions has permitted
them in order to challenge the credibility of a witness due to mental
defectiveness,3 narcotic addiction, 4 where a defendant alleges a defect
for his benefit,5 where the witness is a complaining prosecutrix in a
7
rape case, 6 or where the witness is the plaintiff in a civil action.
An arrangement has been developed in the courts by which the
existence of the proper qualifications for the competence of a witness
to testify are presumed, unless the witness reveals their absence, or
an opposing party proves the witness's inability.8 Competence may be
1 United States v. Klein, 271 F. Supp. 506 (D.D.C. 1967); United States v. Daileda, 229
F. Supp. 148 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 342 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Rosenberg, 108
F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953);
Mangrum v. State, 299 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1957); Ballard v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1966); People v. Champion, 225 P. 278 (Cal. 1924); People v. Bell, 291 P.2d 150 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1955); People v. Nash, 222 N.E.2d 473 (Ill. 1966); Wedmore v. State, 143 N.E.2d
649 (Ind. 1957); Commonwealth v. Repyneck, 124 A.2d 693 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956); State v.
Driver, 107 S.E. 189 (W. Va. 1921).
2 Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956); O'Kon v. Roland, 247 F. Supp.
743 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Markakis v. Liberian S/S The Mparmpa Christos, 161 F. Supp. 487
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 267 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Hiss, 88
F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951);
Taborsky v. State, 116 A.2d 433 (Conn. 1955); Jeffers v. State, 88 S.E. 571 (Ga. 1916);
Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Fries v. Berberich, 177 S.W.
2d 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944); State v. Butler, 143 A.2d 530 (N.J. 1958); People v. Joyce, 134
N.E. 836 (N.Y. 1922); Aguilar v. State, 108 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Ellarson v.
Ellarson, 190 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1921); State v. Armstrong, 62 S.E.2d 50 (N.C. 1950).
3 O'Kon v. Roland, 247 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp.
559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Taborsky v. State, 116 A.2d 433 (Conn. 1955); State v. Butler, 143
A.2d 530 (N.J. 1958); People v. Joyce, 134 N.E. 836 (N.Y. 1922); State v. Armstrong, 62 S.E.
2d 50 (N.C. 1950).
4 Eflinger v. Eflinger, 239 P. 801 (Nev. 1925); State v. Smith, 174 P. 9 (Wash. 1918); cf.
State v. Prentice, 183 N.W. 411 (Iowa 1921). See also Rossman, The Testimony of the Drug
Addicts, 3 ORE. L. REV. 81 (1924); Comment, EVIDENCE-WITNEssES-NARCOTICS As AFFECTING
CREDIBILITY, 16 S. CAL. L. REv. 333 (1943).
5 Fries v. Berberich, 177 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944). A defendant truck driver was
impeached from showing that he had suffered a loss of memory. But see State v. Schrader,
55 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1952).
6 Jeffers v. State, 88 S.E. 571 (Ga. 1916); Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 S.W.2d 679 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1967); People v. Cowles, 224 N.W. 387 (Mich. 1929); State v. Wesler, 59 A.2d
834, aff'd on rehearing,61 A.2d 746 (N.J. 1948); Miller v. State, 295 P. 403 (Okla. Ct. App.
1930); Rice v. State, 217 N.W. 697 (Wis. 1928); cf. Derwin v. Parsons, 18 N.W. 200 (Mich.
1884); State v. Perry, 24 S.E. 634 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1896).
7 Ellarson v. Ellarson, 190 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
8 I J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAw § 484 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as EVIDENCE].
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defined as the ability of a witness to fulfill the three elements of testimonial assertion. These are his abilities of observation, recollection,
and communication.9 In evaluating capacity for the third aspect, communication, two factors must be weighed. These are (1) a mental
capacity to understand the questions and to respond intelligently, and
(2) a willingness to speak the truth as he sees it.'0 It is in this second
component of capacity to communicate where the problem of credibility
of witnesses has arisen. As can be seen, there is a difference between
competence and credibility, the latter being a much narrower and
more subtle factor. Competency is usually a determination of the
court alone, whereas credibility is always an issue to be decided by the
11
jury.
The mainstream of federal decisions dealing with psychiatric impeachment have established relevant factors in determining admissibility. First, a derangement or inability of testimonial assertion must
12
be charged against the witness or evidenced by the witness himself.
Secondly, certain circumstances may exist which make admissibility
the key to the outcome of the case, such as where an entire case rests
upon the testimony of one witness.' The third and paramount factor
controlling admissibility of psychiatric testimony is the sound discretion
of the court in light of the circumstances of each particular case.' 4 All
these factors are important and interrelated.
Admissibility of psychiatric opinion for impeachment was first established in United States v. Hiss.15 The defendant, Alger Hiss, was convicted of perjury largely on the testimony of one man, Whittaker Chambers, the government's principal witness. The defense challenged the
witness's credibility by producing a psychiatrist. This psychiatrist had
never examined Chambers, but had observed him during the trial.
Basing his opinion on courtroom diagnosis, the psychiatrist concluded
that the witness had "'a condition known as psychopathic personality,
9 Id. §§ 479, 493-495; 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS ON EVIDENCE § 271 (2d ed. 1956).
10 11 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 495 (3d ed. 1940); I C. McCoRMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS ON
EVIDENCE § 271 (2d ed. 1956).

11 IlJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 487 (3d ed. 1940).
12 United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 407 (2d Cir. 1956) (homosexuality);
Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956) (sanity of defendant); O'Kon v.
Roland, 247 F. Supp. 743, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (homosexuality); Markakis v. Liberian S/S
The Mparmpa Christos, 161 F. Supp. 487, 498 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 267 F.2d
926 (2d Cir. 1959) (post-traumatic personality disorder); cf. United States v. Rosenberg,
108 F. Supp. 798, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (ability to draw scientific diagram from memory).
18 United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), aJJ'd, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951); accord, United States v. Daileda, 229 F. Supp. 148, 153
(M.D.
Pa.), aLf'd, 342 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1965).
14 E.g., Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118, 124 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v.
Klein, 271 F. Supp. 506, 507 (D.D.C. 1967); United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559, 560
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
15 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), afi'd, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948
(1951).
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which is a disorder of character, of which the outstanding features are
behavior of what . . .[is called] amoral or an asocial or deliquent nature.' "16 After carefully weighing both the motion for the testimony
and strong objections by the government, the Hiss court ruled:
It is apparent that the outcome of this trial is dependent to a
great extent upon the testimony of one man-Whittaker Chambers. Mr. Chambers' credibility is one of the major issues upon
which the jury must pass....
[E]vidence concerning the credibility of the witness is undoubtedly relevant and material and under the circumstances in this
case, and in view of the
foundation which has been laid, I think
17
it should be received.

With the traditional "hornbook law" of inadmissibility as its main
obstacle,"' efforts to apply the Hiss rule have had favorable results in
federal jurisdictions.' 9 Most cases denying admissibility of psychiatric
opinion have carefully left an open door for a relaxation of the tradi20
tional rule of strict inadmissibility.
16 Transcript of Record, Vol. IV, at 2550, United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950), quoted in Conrad, PsychiatricLie Detection: The Federal Courts' Break with
Tradition, 21 F.R.D. 199, 205 (1958).
17 United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp, 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
18 United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); E. CONRAD,
MODERN TRIAL EVIDENCE § 667, at 555-56 (1956), quoted in United States v. Daileda, 229
F. Supp. 148, 153 (M.D. Pa. 1964) provides:
As a general rule, one witness may not give his opinion as to the credibility of
another witness. It is improper to adduce testimony that in the opinion of one
witness another witness is not telling the truth. An expert cannot be asked to give his
opinion on conflicting testimony since to do so he must invade the province of the
jury and pass on the credibility of witnesses.
19 Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956); O'Kon v. Roland, 247 F. Supp.
743, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Markakis v. Liberian S/S The Mparmpa Christos, 161 F. Supp.
487, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
20 United States v. Klein, 271 F. Supp. 506, 507 (D.D.C. 1967). In denying a psychiatric
examination of a witness, the court stated: "It is well established that the grant or denial
of the motion in question [psychiatric examination] is within the discretion of the trial
judge." The Klein court quotes from State v. Butler, 143 A.2d 530, 556 (N.J. 1958):
Manifestly, a practice of granting psychiatric examination of witnesses must be
engaged in with great care. Orders to permit it to be done should be executed only
upon a substantial showing of need and justification. . . . Much reliance must be
placed upon the judgment of the trial court in the individual case.
United States v. Daileda, 229 F. Supp. 148, 153 (M.D. Pa. 1964). The court stated: "Although there has been a tendency in some instances toward a relaxation of this rule,
special circumstances must exist for recognizing an exception to the rule." In discussing
Hiss, the court continued: "However, it is apparent from the opinion that the Court
predicated its ruling on the contended insanity or mental derangement of the witness.
Moreover, it was a perjury trial in which the testimony of the witness attacked was indispensable.
...
(Emphasis added.) United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798, 806
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) provided:
There may be some rare instances when a trial judge permits testimony by medical
experts as to the competence or probity of a witness when appraised solely on his
mental ability to testify truthfully,-that is, whether the witness is a pathological
liar or mentally incapable of telling the truth.
See also Lindsey v. United States, 257 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1956). Although the court
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The existing division among state courts prior to Hiss2 ' was not
substantially alleviated by its decision. 22 Most state courts allowing
psychiatric testimony have done so mainly on the same basis as federal
courts; that is where the fate of the defendant rested on the testimony
of one person and where the discretion of the court had been established.
On occasion the absence of psychiatric testimony has been considered
so critical as to require a new trial.2s Subsequent to a murder conviction, the defendant's brother, who was the state's principal witness,
was found to be a psychotic schizophrenic. Citing a Texas case as support,24 a Connecticut court held:
If the court, after a proper consideration of the evidence as to
Albert's sanity, were to admit his testimony, the evidence of his
mental condition . . . would be available for the jury to use in
passing on his credibility .... And there can be little doubt that
psychiatric testimony is admissible to impeach credibility. 25
The discretion of a court to determine the admissibility of psychiatric
testimony has not been exercised as uniformly in state courts. Some
state courts, both in favor of and against the admissibility of psychiatric
26
testimony, have not allowed flexibility in a lower court's discretion.
Surprisingly, some state courts denying admissibility have provided for
refused to allow testimony by a psychiatrist in relation to a sodium-pentothal induced
statement, the court did acknowledge "an increasing tendency to allow expert psychiatric
opinion testimony as to the credibility and character traits of a witness. ."
21 For cases ruling in favor of admissibility, see Jeffers v. State, 88 S.E. 571 (Ga. 1916);
People v. Cowles, 224 N.W. 387 (Mich. 1929); Fries v. Berberich, 177 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1944); Eflinger v. Eflinger, 239 P. 801 (Nev. 1925); State v. Wesler, 59 A.2d 834, aff'd on
rehearing, 61 A.2d 746 (N.J. 1948); People v. Joyce, 134 N.E. 836 (N.Y. 1922). Ruling
against admissibility were People v. Champion, 225 P. 278 (Cal. 1924); State v. Driver, 107
S.E. 189 (W. Va. 1921); Goodwin v. State, 90 N.W. 170 (Wis. 1902).
22 For cases allowing psychiatric opinion for impeachment, see Ingalls v. Ingalls, 59 So.
2d 898 (Ala. 1952); Taborsky v. State, 116 A.2d 433 (Conn. 1955); Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); State v. Butler, 143 A.2d 580 (N.J. 1958); State
v. Sinnott, 132 A. 2d 298 (N.J. 1957); State v. Armstrong, 62 SE.2d 50 (N.C. 1950); State
v. Kleuber, 132 N.W.2d 847 (S.D. 1965). For cases still holding psychiatric testimony
inadmissible for impeachment, see Mangrum v. State, 299 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1957); Ballard
v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 311 (1966); People v. Nash, 222 N.E.2d 473 (111. 1966);
Wedmore v. State, 143 N.E.2d 649, 654 (Ind. 1957); Commonwealth v. Repyneck, 124 A.2d
693 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956).
28 Taborsky v. State, 116 A.2d 433 (Conn. 1955).
24 Bouldin v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 419, 222 S.W. 555 (1920).
25 Taborsky v. State, 116 A.2d 433, 437 (Conn. 1955).
26 In Wedmore v. State, 143 N.E.2d 649, 654 (Ind. 1957), the court stated:
In our opinion the court has no power on request of the State, to compel a prosecuting witness in a criminal case to submit to a medical examination and, on its
behalf, present the findings of such an examination to the jury via the testimony of
the examining physician, for the purpose of impeaching or supporting the testimony
of such witness.
In a case allowing impeachment, Ellarson v. Ellarson, 190 N.Y.S. 6, 10 (1921), it was stated
that "the court ruled broadly that no evidence could be offered tending to attack the
[I]f necessary to the full development of the truth, the party
sanity of the plaintiff ....
charging insanity is entitled to an opportunity to prove it, if he can."
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a relaxation of this strict inadmissibility. 27 A California court in Ballard v. Superior Court, 28 relied upon in Hopkins, cited considerable
authority 29 in holding:
Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe that
discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric
examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex
violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such
an examination....
...Such necessity would generally arise only if little or no corroboration supported the change and if the defense raised the issue of the effect of the complaining witness's mental or emotional
condition upon her veracity.8 0
This flexibility, although restricted in Ballard, has not always been
subject to this limitation. Another court, in Mangrum v. State,31 also
held inadmissible psychiatric testimony for impeachment. Nevertheless,
the court did not hold for inadmissibility as an inflexible rule, but
instead expressed a flexibility much broader than Ballard. In an aptly
worded opinion, the court not only emphasized flexibility, but actually
based its conclusion upon the injustice which a mentally abnormal
82
witness could create without competent psychiatric impeachment.
Some early Texas cases allowed testimony to impeach the credibility
of a witness, but such testimony usually came from personal acquaintances and were not professional opinions in any sense.83 Nevertheless,
such early lay opinions have made Texas law widely recognized as ad27 Mangrum v. State, 299 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1957); Ballard v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr.
302 (1966); Commonwealth v. Repyneck, 124 A.2d 693 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956).
28 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966).
29 Id. at 313. The court quotes from Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of
Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 648, 663 (1960):
Most of the courts which have dealt with this problem have recognized the authority of the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of a witness on the
question of credibility. The principle established by the majority of the cases is that
the judge has the discretion to order such an examination, although the failure to do
so has rarely been held an abuse of discretion.
a0 Ballard v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 313 (1966) (emphasis added).
81299 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1957).
82 Id. at 84. The court provided:
We agree that evidence may be offered to the jury regarding the insanity of a witness or mental delusions that a witness may suffer. This is because a witness may testify
ever so brilliantly to the jury, and yet his insanity or mental delusions may not
appear. But, when we come to the question of whether a witness has low mental
comprehension-absent, as here, any claim of insanity or mental delusions-it seems
that the trial judge should have discretion to decide whether the trial should be
prolonged by calling witnesses to give their opinions to the jury, or whether the
matter is sufficiently clear for the jury to intelligently determine credibility without
the trial being prolonged by such testimony as to the mental comprehension of another witness. We hold that the trial judge has discretion in this matter; and we
cannot say that he abused his discretion in the case at bar. (Court's emphasis.)
33 Kellner v. Randle, 165 S.W. 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1914, writ dism'd); Wren
v. Howland, 75 S.W. 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, writ ref'd).
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mitting impeachment evidence alleging mental disorder.8 4 With one
exception,8 5 Texas precedent does not clearly demonstrate whether
opinion given for impeachment was professional in nature or volunteered by acquaintances.8 6 For example, in a trial for robbery by firearms, the defendant attempted to discredit the state's principal witness,
the victim of the crime.8 7 It cannot be determined from the opinion
the precise nature of the impeachment testimony. Nevertheless, the
lower court did not admit such impeachment on credibility. In holding
error, the court of criminal appeals reversed the judgment, stating:
Appellant should have been permitted to make proof that the
witness was idiotic, and therefore incompetent as a witness ...
It was admissible for another purpose. If he was not insane or
idiotic so as not to be able to testify, still such testimony could be
used as impeachment of the witness. .... 8
The same court relied on this decision in determining a more recent
Texas case, in which a trial court had not allowed the appellant in a
murder prosecution to challenge the credibility of a witness before the
jury.8 9 In reversing the trial judgment, the court found that the "appellant had the right to offer evidence before the jury as to . . . [a
witness's] insanity or the extent of his impairment of mind . . .,40
There is an earlier Texas criminal case which shakes the roots of
Hopkins' strict inadmissibility rule. Anderson v. State4 ' borders on
outright admissibility of psychiatric testimony for impeachment, and
may have feasibly been just that. 42 The appellant was convicted of
second-degree murder. In his defense, the defendant offered evidence
that one of the state's main witnesses was a "cocaine fiend. ' 48 As in
Hopkins, the defendant offered an expert witness to show the effect of
the habitual use of morphine and cocaine upon an individual. 4 4 This
84 Note, Psychiatric Challenge of Witnesses, 9 VAND. L. REV. 860, 864 (1956) provides,
"The Texas Court of Civil Appeals has consistently admitted lay testimony on the question of mental condition offered for purposes of impeachment." See also, Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CALIF. L. REv.
648, 654 (1960).
85 Anderson v. State, 65 Tex. Crim. 365, 144 S.W. 281 (1912).
86 Bouldin v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 419, 222 S.W. 555 (1920).
87 Id.
881d. at 423, 222 S.W. at 556. It is interesting to note that Bouldin was interpreted as
supporting the Hiss decision. In citing the Texas case, the Hiss court concluded, "There
are some state cases in which such testimony [psychiatric] has been held admissible or
which indicate that if this question had been presented, it would have been admissible.
(Emphasis added.)
89 Saucier v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 301, 235 S.W.2d 903 (1950).
40d. at 320, 235 S.W. at 916.
4165 Tex. Crim. 365, 144 S.W. 281 (1912).
42 It cannot be determined from the opinion whether Dr. Woods was a licensed
sy
chiatrist,. but the nature of his testimony would imply a psychiatric opinion. Id. at 367
144 S.W. at 282.
48 Id.
44 Id. at 367, 144 S.W. 282.
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testimony was excluded by the trial court. In finding error, the court
of criminal appeals held:
We are of opinion, as the matter is presented by this record, that
this evidence should have gone to the jury. If upon another trial
it can be shown the witness was a cocaine fiend and to such an extent that it would impair her mental and moral sensibilities, it is
and would be a legitimate inquiry before the jury. It certainly
would affect the credibility of the witness and the weight to be
given her testimony.45
With Hopkins in mind, the Anderson decision is alarmingly clear.
It has been cited as support for admission of expert medical testimony
in other cases where drug addiction impaired a witness's credibility. 46
The Hopkins court expresses alarm at the thought of juries being
exposed to a "battle of experts" by the use of psychiatry. 47 But why
should such a battle develop only with psychiatrists and not other
experts? 48 The Texas court acknowledges that fact in its own opinion:

It is true that these same objections can be properly leveled at
all expert testimony. However, we feel that psychiatric impeachdiffers, for the reasons stated, from other expert
ment testimony
49
testimony.
It is true that psychiatric testimony can become very lengthy and
involved, 50 but why it should be distinguished from evidence supplied
by other experts as in fingerprinting, medicine, or other complex
sciences, is difficult to reconcile. In cases where such confusion or disagreement could occur, the jury is always free to reject the psychiatric
testimony just as any other expert testimony. 51
While psychiatric information is not known by most laymen, there
is still available to the jury the usual impeachment evidence such
as criminal convictions and prior inconsistent statements to assist
in the determination of credibility. Thus, unlike the case of highly
technical issues, the jury, even without psychiatric testimony will
not be left "in the dark."5 2 .
The court in its opinion would infer that, where psychiatric opinion is
Id. at 367, 144 S.W. 282.
State v. Smith, 174 P. 9 (Wash. 1918).
47 Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212, 221 (rex. Crim. App. 1972).
48 See II J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 563 (3d ed. 1940).
49 Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
50 See, e.g., State v. Jack Ruby, 6:4 TRAUMA 5 (1964).
51 II J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 673 (3d ed. 1940). Dean Wigmore states:
F he jury may still reject his testimony (expert) and accept his opponent's, and .no
egal power, not even the judge's order, can compel them to accept the witness' statement against their will.
52 Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212, 221 (rex. Crim. App. 1972).
45
46
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unavailable, the tools of criminal convictions and prior inconsistent
statements are always at hand as protection against a cunning psycho53
pathic liar who could "brilliantly" deceive any jury.
In citing United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 4 the Hopkins court cannot add support to its adoption of inadmissibility as an inflexible rule.
In an effort to emphasize the vagueness and confusion that psychiatry
can breed in the courtroom the Hopkins court misleadingly quotes the
concurring opinion by Judge Jerome N. Frank.5 5 Ironically, the Texas
court is apparently unaware of Judge Frank's true outlook on psychiatry
clearly expressed in literature authored by the same jurist.5 6 In all
likelihood, Judge Frank would have probably disagreed with the Hopkins decision in light of his interpretation of Hiss.57 His main reason
for disagreeing with the Hiss ruling was that Chambers, the government's key witness, had not received previous clinical observation or
interviews by the psychiatrist, a requirement which seems to have been
fulfilled in Hopkins."'
In summary, it is evident that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
has clearly laid down in Hopkins a rigid and inflexible rule for exclusion of psychiatric opinion for impeachment. It has not followed a
more lenient path evidenced in many federal and state jurisdictions.
The court has disregarded previous Texas precedent which would
seem to have justified a more elastic result. In leaving such inconsistencies as Anderson unattended, not only does it evidence a lack of depth
53 Mangrum v. State, 299 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Ark. 1957).
F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956), cited in Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212, 221 (rex. Crim.
Ap54 .237
1972).
5 United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 412 (2d Cir. 1956). It is worth

noting that Flores.Rodriguez is the only federal case cited by the court in Hopkins which
could be interpreted as adverse to admissibility of psychiatric testimony, and yet psychiatric testimony was never an issue in the case. In his concurring opinion, Circuit Judge
Frank states: "I think it a mistake for my colleagues needlessly to embark-without a
pilot, rudder, compass or radar-on an amateur's voyage on the fog-enshrouded sea of
psychiatry." Id. at 412. Judge Frank was referring to the court's effort to interpret psychiatric terminology in various statutes, without the aid of psychiatrists. He did not mean
to keep a wary distance from psychiatry because of its confusion and complexity as the
Hopkins court implies in its opinion. Psychiatric opinion, in fact, may well have provided the "pilot, rudder, compass or radar" Judge Frank's brothers on the court so badly
needed.
58 Frank, Judicial Fact.Finding and Psychology, 14 OHIo ST. ,L.J. 183 (1953). Judge
Frank comments:
It is a commonplace that a witness may be seriously mistaken in one or all of three
ways: (1) He may have erred in his original observation of the past event. (2) Or in
his subsequent memory of what he observed. (3) Or in the way his memory of his
original observation is communicated to the trial court.
The psychologists and psychiatrists know much about each of these three foci of
infection and about the physiological and psychological factors which cause such
errors. The courts, however, have done relatively little to learn, or to useithis
psychological and psychiatric wisdom. (Emphasis added.)
57 Id. at 185. Judge Frank observes: "In the Hiss case, the psychiatrists testified about
the witness Chambers. But they did so without an opportunity for clinical examination
or interviews."
58 Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972): "Dr. Yero testified
that he had 'previously examined' Marquez."
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for its strict inadmissibility rule, but has also culminated in a decision
which prevents a far more workable and flexible rule for the courts
of Texas. The point respectfully made is not whether psychiatric testimony for impeachment should or should not be allowed in Texas, but
rather, whether it was wise for the Hopkins decision to provide for Texas
courts a strict inflexible rule of inadmissibility for such testimony, in
light of the elasticity provided for the rule by courts of other jurisdictions, both for and against admissibility. Not only could such an opinion
be critical in many instances, but more importantly the courts should
be allowed to exercise discretion in consideration of the facts in each
case. As complex as facts and personalities can be in each particular
case, the Hopkins court has deprived Texas criminal courts of the right
to exercise their discretion in determining the benefit that competent
psychiatric testimony would give their juries. In overlooking the opinion of evidence scholars on the matter59 and other varied literature in
favor of the increased use of psychiatry in the courtroom,6 0 the Texas
court has failed to recognize that "there are certain difficult areas in
which the jury may be assisted by, or must have, expert testimony in
determining fact questions." 611 The court unduly limited the potential
benefit of psychiatry in Texas courts by establishing such rigid inadmissibility and disregarding the discretion of the courts. In dissenting,
Judge Morrison aptly states:
I cannot, however, bring myself to agree with that portion of the
majority opinion which pronounced an inflexible rule which does
not permit any psychiatric testimony for impeachment purposes.
...
I quote from Ballard, supra:
"Thus, in rejecting the polar extremes of an absolute prohibition and an absolute requirement that the prosecutrix submit
to a psychiatric examination, we have accepted a middle
ground, placing the matter in the discretion of the trial
judge."62
Joseph H. Vives
59 III J. WIGmoRE,EVIDENCE §§ 924a, 931, 932, 935, 997b, 998b (3d ed. 1940).
60 ALI MoDsL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rules 106, 401, & 409, cited in United States v. Hiss, 88
F. Supp. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Report of the American Bar Association's Committee on
the Improvement of the Law of Evidence, 1937-1938, discussed in III J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE §§ 746, 924a (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1970); Conrad, Psychiatric Lie Detection: The
Federal Courts' Break with Tradition, 21 F.R.D. 199 (1958); Curran, Expert Psychiatric
Evidence of Personality Traits, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 999 (1955); Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions
as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CAI.i. L. REv. 648 (1960); Comment, PsychiatricEvaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324 (1950);
Comment, Psychiatric Testimony for the Impeachment of Witnesses in Sex Cases, 39 J.
CiuM. L. 750 (1949); Note, The Mentally Abnormal Witness: Challenges to His Competency
and Credibility, 13 RuTGERs L. REV. 330 (1959); Note, Psychiatric Challenge of Witnesses,
9 VAND. L REV. 860 (1956); Note, Psychiatric Aid in Evaluating the Credibility of a
Prosecuting Witness Charging Rape, 26 IND. L.J. 98 (1950).
61 Steakley, Expert Medical Testimony in Texas, I ST. MARY'S L.J. 161 (1969).
62 Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (emphasis added).
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